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I. INTRODUCTION
Four decades ago 89,500 illegitimate children were born in the
United States.' In startling contrast, over 318,000 illegitimate children
were conceived in 1967,2 despite the existence of I.U.D.'s, diaphragms,
and the "Pill". The new morality has given birth to an illegitimacy rate
which has grown 16.9 percent between 1940 and 1967.'
Of course, as the illegitimacy rate soars, so do the associated costs.
The economic burden alone4 that is borne by the public cannot be es-
timated accurately because of the diverse sources of assistance; 5 how-
*Member, Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor,
Freshman Research and Writing.
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, table 59,
at 50 (1969).
2. Id. In 1967, 318,100 illegitimate children were born, 142,300 being white, and 175,800
being nonwhite. It should be noted that this figure represents only those reported out-of-
wedlock births, and reflects neither the number of children born to parents who entered into
"shotgun" weddings, nor the number of children born to parents who had invalid common
law marriages, nor the number of children born to adulterous wives.
3. Id. In 1940, the illegitimacy rate (number of illegitimate births per 1,000 unmarried
women) was 7.1, rising to 24.0 in 1967.
4. In addition to the economic cost, the illegitimate child constitutes an increasing
physiological and socio-psychological burden to society. See text, infra, p. 718, et seq.
5. There are currently some 200 maternity homes in the United States, most of which
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ever, recent statistics indicate that the federal government and the
various state governments contribute well over $3,384,059,000 annually
to children under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Pro-
gram.6
For centuries, bastardy or paternity laws7 have existed to ease the
burdens of illegitimacy. The prima facie purpose of such acts is to de-
termine paternity in order to compel parents to support their children.
The law thus seeks to convert a moral obligation into a legal duty."
However, in view of the above statistics, one cannot help but won-
der: "Whither hast the law gone?" The answer is unequivocal-no-
where. A new morality has bred increased illegitimacy and living costs
have spiraled, but the law has remained static and unresponsive to both
changing prices and changing sexual attitudes.
Unfortunately, the Paternity Act of Florida' is subject to the same
criticism directed at such laws in general. True, the Florida Statutes
have attempted to compensate for the increased costs-of-living through
recent revisions in the amount of the paternity award,10 but to say that
the Act is responsive to the current concept of morality, would be to ig-
nore its inherent deficiencies."
This paper will examine the question of whether paternity laws
can reduce the problems of illegitimacy, and, if so, the ways in which
such laws can best be made responsive to the changing moral and eco-
nomic conditions of society. Particular emphasis will be placed on the
Florida Bastardy Act,' 2 with a view towards revising the existing sub-
stantive and procedural law governing paternity actions in Florida.' s
can accommodate forty girls for approximately a three-month stay. Interview with Mary
Hallock, Director of the Florence Crittenton Home, in Miami, Florida, Mar. 18, 1969.
In 1968, expenditures by the federal government, state governments, and local programs
totaled $128,561,000 for maternal and child health services. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 1, table 439 at 300.
6. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, note 1 supra, table 436 at 298.
7. See text infra, p. 715 et seq.
8. As stated by the court in de Moya v. de Pena, 148 So.2d 735, 736 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963):
[Tihe purpose of this type of statute [FLA. STAT. § 742.0111 is to convert a natural
and moral obligation of a father to support his illegitimate offspring into a legal
obligation ...
9. FLA. STAT. ch. 742 (1967). The Act, though titled the Florida Bastardy Act, is
referred to preferably as a paternity law in that it is civil, not criminal, in nature. Williams
v. State, 80 Fla. 286, 85 So. 917 (1920).
10. FLA. STAT. § 742.031 ('1951), repealed FLA. STAT. § 742.03 (1949), to provide for
scheduled payments ranging from $40 monthly to $110 monthly, depending on the age of
the child. See text'infra, p. 728 et seq.
The former statute required the father to pay an amount "not exceeding fifty dollars
yearly, for ten yeari . " . FLA. STAT. § 742.03 (1949).
11. See text in/ra, p. 719 et seq.
12. FLA. STAT. § 742 (1967).
13. This paper is limited to a discussion of the substantive and procedural aspects of
paternity actions. A discussion of the evidentiary aspects of such proceedings is an extensive
topic in itself and is beyond the scope of this article.
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II. BACKGROUND
Under English common law, neither the father nor the mother were
under any duty to support their children.' 4 However, the problem of
supporting pauper children forced Parliament to enact the Poor Law of
1576.1 This law was designed to punish and deter promiscuous behav-
ior, while shifting the financial burden from the parish to the parents
of the illegitimate child,'" and achieved this result by imposing a stat-
utory duty of support on both parents.
This English Statute became the basis for subsequent legislation
in the colonies. Indeed, according to Vernier, bastardy proceedings in
the United States still maintain their close connection with poor relief.
[P]roceedings may generally be instigated by the mother, but
frequently the poor authorities are given power to bring the
action concurrently with the mother or in case the mother fails
to act. The low maximum limits to the sum which may be or-
dered to be paid for the child's support, and the smallness of
the sums actually awarded . . . also indicate that the statutes
still retain considerable flavor of the poor law.' 7
Today, all states except Idaho,' s Missouri,'" and Texas, 20 have en-
acted statutes requiring the putative father to support his illegitimate
child. Though the remaining states have statutes similar to the English
Bastardy Act,2 ' legislation varies among them. For example, California
imposes on both parents a duty to support their illegitimate children,22
while Louisiana provides that fathers and mothers owe their illegitimate
14. C. VERNIER, IV AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 206 (1936) [hereinafter cited as VERNIER].
15. Poor Law Act, 18 Eliz. I, c. 3 (1576):
Concerning bastards begotten and born out of lawful matrimony, . . . the
said bastards being now left to be kept at the charges of the parish where they
be born, to the great burden of the same parish, and in defrauding of the relief of
the impotent and aged true poor of the same parish, and to the evil example and
encouragement of lewd life: (2) it is ordained . . . [tlhat two justices of the
peace . . . , as well for the punishment of the mother and reputed father of such
bastard child, as also for the better relief of every such parish . . . , shall . . .
take order for the keeping of every such bastard child, by charging such mother or
reputed father, with the payment of money weekly, or other sustentation for the
relief of such child, in such wise as they shall think meet and convenient ...
16. A similar purpose is expressed in Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 N.Y.2d 408, 411, 141
N.E.2d 562, 563, 161 N.Y.S.2d 48, 50 (1957) ; Allen v. Hunnicutt, 230 N.C. 49, 52 S.E.2d 18
(1949).
17. VERNIER, supra note 14, at 207.
18. See 30 Mo. L. REV. 154, 155 (1965).
19. Since Easley v. Gordon, 51 Mo. App. 637 (1892), Missouri has held that the father
of an illegitimate child is not legally responsible for the child's support. See generally
Comment, Support of Illegitimate Children in Missouri, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 311 (1968).
But see text infra, p. 724 et seq.
20. See 30 Mo. L. REV. 154, 155 (1965).
21. Id. For tabular summaries and comparisons of the illegitimacy laws of each American
jurisdiction, see Schatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings app. IV at 619-88 (3d ed. 1953);
Vernier, supra, note 14 at 220-62.
22. CAL. CIV. CODE § 196a (Deering Supp. ;970)..
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children "alimony." 28 Massachusetts and Pennsylvania make it a mis-
demeanor for a man, not being the husband of a woman, to impregnate
her.2
4
A. The Attempt at Uniform Legislation
Although the paternity laws have remained relatively static over
the years, this past decade can boast of one important and progressive
development: In 1960 the American Bar Association approved the Uni-
form Act on Paternity. 8 Since its approval, it has been adopted in only
four states-Kentucky, 26 Mississippi,27 Montana, 28  and Utah29-and
restricted, in one way or another, by three of these states.8
As indicated in the notes of the chairman of the drafting committee,
the Uniform Act on Paternity was originally drafted to revise the Uni-
form Illegitimacy Act; the latter having been promulgated in 1922, and
adopted (with numerous amendments) by seven states.81 However, the
committee found it necessary to disregard the old "pattern" in its at-
tempt to "furnish an acceptable modernized procedure for handling
a troublesome social problem ... 2,82
B. The Legislation in Florida
Unfortunately, Florida, despite the fact that its number of illegit-
imate births ranked in the top 10 percent of the nation in 1964,8 is
23. LA. CiV. CODE art. 240 (West 1952): "Fathers and mothers owe alimony to their
illegitimate children, when they are in need."
24. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 11 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. ch. 2, tit. 18, § 4506
(Purdon 1963).
25. 9 B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 522 (1966).
26. Ky. REV. STAT. § 406.011 et seq. (1964).
27. Miss. CODE ANN. § 383-01 et seq. (1962).
28. MONT. REV. CoDEs ANN. § 93-2901-1 et seq. (1963).
29. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-1 et seq. (1965).
30. Utah appears to be the only state to give the Act its intended effect. For example,
section 1 of the Act provides that "a child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a
married woman by a man other than her husband." Kentucky omits this provision, while
Montana makes it subject to the presumption of legitimacy of a child born in lawful
wedlock.
The Act, as adopted by Kentucky and Mississippi varies with respect to section 2
(enforcement), section 5 (remedies), section 7 (authority for blood tests), and section 10
(effect of test results).
31. Iowa, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Wyoming adopted the Uniform Illegitimacy Act; although New Mexico and New York
made "considerable changes." See VERNER, supra note 14, at 207-08.
32. 9 B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 522, Commentator's Prefatory Note (1966).
33. In 1964, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia reported the number of
illegitimate children born in their respective states. That year, Florida boasted 12,384
illegitimate births, trailing only Illinois (17,096), Texas (14,906), Pennsylvania (12,966), and
Ohio (12,780). California, Massachusetts, and New York were among the non-reporting
states, and it was estimated that together they accounted for some 26,000 illegitimate births.
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 764 (1969).
Florida no longer requires the birth certificate of a child to indicate whether or not he is
legitimate; however, a recent television program indicated that in Dade County there was
a 40 percent increase in white illegitimate births between 1964 (732 births) and 1967 (1034
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not among those states which have adopted the Uniform Act on Pater-
nity. The Florida Bastardy Act dates back to 1828.84 At that time,
proceedings were initiated by a complaint before a justice of the peace
or magistrate, who, upon a finding of sufficient grounds, ordered the
defendant to appear before the circuit court. Consequently, the pro-
ceedings were quasi-criminal in their inception but became civil once
they reached the circuit court.85 Today, the entire proceeding is a civil
one.
86
As in most states, the action is initiated by a complaint filed by
the mother or expectant mother87 alleging that she is an unmarried
woman,88 that she is either pregnant or has delivered a child in the
jurisdiction where the complaint is made, which child would by law be
deemed a bastard,89 and that she accuses a named person of being the
father of the child.
Hearings upon the complaint are held in chambers; although, upon
the request of either party, the issue of paternity may be tried by a
jury.1° Having determined the issue of paternity and the ability of the
parents to support the child, the court then orders the defendant to pay
the complainant, her guardian, or such other person assuming respon-
sibility for the child as the judge may direct, a sum sufficient to pay
reasonable attorney's fees, hospital and medical expenses, and other costs
births). "For Your Information: Susan is Pregnant," channel 4, Miami, Fla.,.June 4, 1969.
In addition, a news article revealed that Florida ranked sixth in the nation in children born
to unwed mothers and that the yearly cost of such births is $14 million. Miami Herald,
Dec. 21, 1969, § B, at 1, col. 1.
34. Act of Jan. 5, 1828 § 1.
35. State v. Rowe, 99 Fla. 972, 128 So. 7 (1930).
36. FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (1967).
37. Id. See also Pelak v. Karpa, 146 Conn. 370, 151 A.2d 333 (1959); Clarke v.
Blackburn, 151 So.2d 325 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963). But see Leonard v. Werger, 21 N.J. 539, 122
A.2d 777 (1956) (bastardy proceeding maintainable by duly authorized representative of
State Board of Child Welfare or by appropriate municipal director of welfare).
38. Under an earlier statute, a bastardy action could be initiated only by a single
woman. See e.g., Bishop v. State, 136 Fla. 268, 186 So. 413 (1939). However, changing the
provision to say "unmarried woman," did not change the meaning of the statute. [1951-1952]
FLA. ATT' GEN. BirENNx REP. 717.
Compare Ventresco v. Bushey, 159 Me. 241, 191 A.2d 104 (1963) (woman, whose child
was born after her divorce, could maintain bastardy proceeding) with State v. Hunt, 13
Utah 2d 32, 368 P.2d 261 (1962) (information charging bastardy was not subject to motion
to quash merely because when child was conceived of adulterous intercourse with defendant,
mother was married to another man) and State ex rel Crouser v. Mercer, 141 W. Va.
691, 92 S.E.2d 745 (1956) ("unmarried" refers to the woman's status at the time of the
birth of her child, not at the time she makes the complaint).
See also 9 B UNiFORm LAWS ANN. 522 § 1 (1965).
39. It should be noted that Florida indulges in the widely held, though rebuttable,
presumption that a child conceived or born during marriage is legitimate. See, e.g.,
Kennelly v. Davis, 221 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1969); B.S.B. v. B.S.F., 217 So.2d 599 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1969), accord, In re Ho Chang Shee, 48 Hawaii 391, 402 P.2d 678 (1965); Lucas v.
Williams, 218 Md. 322, 146 A.2d 764 (1958); In re Thomas' Estate, 228 Ark. 658, 310
S.W.2d 248 (1958); Woodum v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 212 Ga. 386, 93 S.E.2d 12
(1956).
40. FLA. STAT. § 742.031 (1967).
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incident to the birth of the child." In addition, the defendant is ordered
to pay periodically, for the support of the child, such sums as the court
may direct."2 This periodic payment is in the nature of a penalty and
is not affected by the actual pecuniary expenses which the mother may
incur. 8
Incident to the enforcement of its judgment, the court may require
bond of the defendant . 4 Upon default in payment of any moneys or-
dered by the court to be paid, the court may enter a judgment for the
amount in default.4 5 In addition, the defendant's wilful failure to com-
ply with a court order is punishable through contempt proceedings. 46
It should be noted that the court retains jurisdiction for the pur-
pose of entering such other orders as the changing circumstances of the
parties may require.4 7 Furthermore, the liability of the father for the
support of the child terminates upon the adoption of the latter by some
person other than the father.4 8
III. THE PROBLEMS OF ILLEGITIMACY
The problem confronting us is a twofold one. On the one hand, it
is necessary to understand the social problems associated with illegit-
imacy, while on the other hand, it is necessary to determine the specific
areas wherein the law, specifically the Florida Paternity Act, is deficient
in coping with the problems of the illegitimate child.
A. The Social Dilemma
The effects of illegitimacy have been characterized as being of
three types: physiological, economic, and socio-psychological. The phys-
iological effects are due mainly to the substandard medical attention
given the pregnant mother and later, her child.' The economic conse-
quences are less direct. Often, pregnancy forces the school-age mother5"
to drop out of school, to which she seldom returns.5 As a result, her
earning capacity is diminished, and the cost of supporting her child is
41. Id.
42. FLA. STAT. § 742.041 (1967).
43. Indeed the main fault with this statute is its failure to concern itself with the "best
interests of the child." See text infra, p. 719 et seq.
44. FLA. STAT. § 742.08 (1967).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. FLA. STAT. § 742.06 (1967). See, e.g., Crosby v. Calhoun, 76 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1955);
Murray v. Murray, 117 So.2d 425 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
48. FLA. STAT. § 742.07 (1967).
49. Anderson, Jenss & Richter, The Medical, Social, and Educational Implications of the
Increase in Out-of-Wedlock Births, 56 Am. J. PuB. HEALTH & THE NATION'S HEALTH 1866
(1966); Bernstein, Gaps in Services to Unmarried Mothers, 10 CHILDREN 49 (1963).
50. Some 350,000 teenage illegitimate births are predicted for 1970. See Vincent, Illegit-
imacy in the Next Decade, CHILD WELFARE 514 (Dec. 1964).
51. Kelley, The School and Unmarried Mothers, 10 CHILDREN 60 (1963).
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shifted to society.5" The situation tends to be self-perpetrating in that
it fosters a situation conducive to even more illegitimate births. 8
More important, though, are the social and psychological implica-
tions for the individual which spring from society's contradictory at-
titude toward sex and unmarried mothers. After the birth of the child,
society points its finger of condemnation, not only at the mother, but
also at the child.54 Unfortunately, this disapproval has found expression
in various areas of the law. Frequently, the amount of support which
an illegitimate child receives is less than would be received by a legit-
imate child. 5" In addition, the illegitimate child must first prove his pa-
ternity in order to be entitled to any support from his father.56
B. The Statutory Dilemma
The deficiencies in the present Florida law become apparent when
one realizes the confusion existing in the court as to its proper func-
tion under the law. That is, the courts have not resolved the issue of
whether the aim of the statute is to punish the father or to give the
unwed mother support, and they consequently miss the essence of the
problem-namely, the best interests of the child.
1. MARRIED WOMEN AND THE PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY
One of the main devices that the statutes use to avoid concern for
the child's welfare is a provision which allows only an unmarried woman
to bring a paternity action.57 A married woman whose husband is not
the child's father is precluded from seeking support for her child even
though the child itself may be born out of lawful wedlock due to an in-
tervening divorce or annulment.58
The inequities in this presumption were readily apparent in the
case of B.S.B. v. B.S.F.59 In B.S.B., a woman whose marriage was an-
nulled, subsequently sought to bring a paternity action against the child's
real father. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the basis of the presumed legitimacy of a child born to a
married woman.8 0
52. See note 6 supra.
53. Anderson, supra note 49, at 1871. See also Sarrel and Davis, The Unwed Primipara,
95 AM. J. OBSTET. Gvnac. 722 (1966) wherein the authors discuss a study in which 340
illegitimate babies were born to 100 teenage girls over a five-year period, all but five girls
having more than one child.
54. Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 AM. J. Soc. 215, 227-28 (1939).
55. See Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MicH. L. REv. 477, 478 (1967).
56. FLA. STAT. § 742.031 (1967).
57. FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (1967).
58. See, e.g., Kennelly v. Davis, 221 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1969); Gossett v. Ullendorff, 114
Fla. 159, 154 So. 177 (1934) ; Sanders v. Yancey, 122 So.2d 202 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1060).
59. 217 So.2d 599 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) ; See also Note, The Presumption of Legitimacy-
as affected by Standing, Antenuptial Conception, and the Lord Mansfield Rule, 24 U. MAMi
L. REv. 414 (1970).
60. The presumption of legitimacy was rebuttable even at common law when the
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In order to achieve an equitable result and remove the child from
the state welfare rolls, the appellate court reversed and remanded for a
determination of the paternity issue. However, the means used by the
court to achieve this result were appalling. Firmly convinced that the
only way the woman could bring the paternity action was if she were
unmarried, the court set out to prove that the annulment of the first
marriage voided it ab initio, so that at no time was she ever married;
therefore, any child born to her during the period of her alleged mar-
riage would be illegitimate. Normally, in order to preserve the legit-
imacy of children born during such marriages, a Florida annulment is
effective as of the date the decree is entered.01 This statute was appar-
ently overlooked by the judges in B.S.B.; either that, or they distin-
guished the case on the basis that the marriage was not merely voidable,
but void. Surely, the circuitous means used in this case to achieve a
fair result illustrates the inability of the current law to cope with the
needs of today's society.
In addition to the irrationality of denying a married woman the
right to bring a paternity proceeding on the basis of the presumed legit-
imacy of a child conceived or born during lawful wedlock, such denial
may well constitute a denial of equal protection. 2
The United States Supreme Court pointed out in McLaughlin v.
Florida,"8 that in order for a statutory classification not to deny equal
protection, it must rest on some difference that bears a just and reason-
able relation to that statute in respect to which the classification is pro-
posed. Regardless of whether the purpose of Florida Statute section
742.011 (1967), is to legislate morality or to relieve the public of sup-
port obligations, the distinction in the statute between a married woman
and an unmarried woman who concieves or gives birth to a child out
of wedlock bears no reasonable relation to such purposes.
Certainly, if the intent of the statute is to convert a father's moral
obligation to support his child into a legal one, 4 that obligation arises
from the father's relation to the child, not from the mother's marital
status. By allowing the putative father to circumvent his responsibility,
the statute is, in effect, encouraging immorality.
Alternatively, if the intent of the statute is to relieve the public of
its obligation to support the child, while making sure that the child is
husband was out of the country or beyond the four seas for nine months so that no access
to his wife could be presumed. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS 457 (1787).
This was subsequently changed and only proof of nonaccess of the husband was
required. Pendrell v. Pendrell, 93 Eng. Rep. 945 (K.B. 1732).
61. FLA. STAT. § 61.051 (1967), construed in In re Ruff's Estate, 159 Fla. 777, 32 So.2d
840 (1947).
62. See generally Brief of Petitioner at 12-18, Kennelly v. Davis, 221 So.2d 415 (Fla.
1969).
63. 379 U.S. 184, on remand 172 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1965).
64. de Moya v. de Pena, 148 So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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properly provided for,6" it seems incongruous that the child who is con-
ceived during, but born out of, wedlock would have different support
needs than a child born to a woman who has never been married. By
precluding the once-married mother from seeking support from the
child's putative father, the state is only saddling itself with another sup-
port obligation and is thwarting the very purpose of the Act.
If society is really concerned with the best interests of the child,
it is about time that all children are granted the equal protection of
the law. To grant child "A" support, while denying it to child "B"
merely because "A" was conceived after his mother's marriage was dis-
solved, while "B" was conceived during the marriage, is to penalize so-
ciety and child "B" for his parents' indiscretion.
The equal protection argument has gained impetus recently by vir-
tue of two Supreme Court decisions. In Levy v. Louisiana,6 the United
States Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Louisiana courts which
rejected a wrongful death action brought by five illegitimates on the
grounds that the wrongful death statute authorized only actions by legit-
imate children. The Court held that since the children's illegitimacy was
in no way related to the wrong inflicted on their mother, it was a denial
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to deny
their right to a remedy solely because of the circumstances of their
births.
The same reasoning was applied in Glona v. American Guarantee &
Liability Insurance Co., 7 where the Court reversed a Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals decision68 which held that the mother of an illegitimate son
could not maintain an action for his wrongful death. In support of their
reversal, the Court held that the equal protection clause was violated
when the state withheld relief from the plaintiff on the sole basis that
the son was born out-of-wedlock.
The social philosophy of Kowalski v. Wojtkowski,6 9 which also
pervades the law of Florida can no longer be justified. The majority in
Kowalski believed that evidence (as to nonaccess) given by a married
woman should be inadmissible since it would invade the sanctity of the
conjugal relationship. Such reasoning is almost facetious. In a bastardy
proceeding brought by a married woman, the issue is not what did occur
between the married couple, but what did not occur between them. 70
65. B.S.B. v. B.S.F., 217 So.2d 599 (Fla. 2d Dist 1969); Kowalski v. Wojtkowski, 19
N.J. 247, 116 A.2d 6 (1955) (Dissent).
66. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
67. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
68. 379 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1967).
69. 19 N.J. 247, 116 A.2d 6 (1955).
70. As noted by the court in Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937),
bastardy proceedings of this type do not in fact invade the sanctity of married intercourse
and matrimonial relations.
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The modern view is perhaps best expressed in the recent case of
R-v. R- .1
The principles applied by the United States Supreme Court
would render invalid state action which produces discrimina-
tion between legitimate and illegitimate children insofar as
the right of the child to compel support by his father is con-
cerned. Under the guise of discouraging illegitimacy, states
may no longer cast the burden upon the innocent child.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court compel
the conclusion that the proper construction of our statutory
provisions relating to the obligations and rights of parents ...
affords illegitimate children (the right) to require support by
their fathers.
2. THE HEARING: JURY TRIALS, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT,
AND "EXCEPTIO"
For the woman "fortunate" enough to be unmarried when she con-
ceived her bastard child, Florida Statutes section 742.031 (1967), pro-
vides for a hearing at which the best interests of the child are again
overlooked, or rather, ignored. The most glaring defect in the statute
is the provision for a jury trial on the issue of paternity. The fact that
this morsel of sensationalism remains in a paternity proceeding in this
decade is appalling. It is illogical that the circuit court continues to
have jury trials in bastardy cases which are on the chancery side of
the court.72 Again, the court has abetted the legislature in denying chil-
dren equal protection under the law. The legitimate child whose parents
are getting divorced may secure support without enduring a jury trial,
while the illegitimate's very right to support may be contingent on a
jury verdict.7
To aggravate an already battered condition, the courts have al-
lowed the defendant the right to claim the privilege against self-in-
crimination.74 At this point, the hearing becomes most entertaining. The
protagonists in a paternity proceeding are the mother, the putative
father, and their friends (the witnesses). Assuming the defendant father
requests a jury trial, the jury is instructed to remember that in weighing
the evidence, the testimony of the mother is that of an interested party.75
71. 431 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo. 1968).
72. Even though the Supreme Court of Florida has adopted the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 187 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1966) which provide for a procedural merger of law and equity,
FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (1967) continues to refer to bastardy proceedings as being in chancery.
73. Compare FLA. STAT. ch. 61 (1967) with FLA. STAT. ch. 742 (1967).
74. Jones v. Stoutenburgh, 91 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1956) (filing of counter-affidavits in a
paternity proceeding was not inconsistent with claiming the privilege of self-incrimination,
because the affidavits didn't cover the entire area of proof).
75. John D.C. v. State, 16 Fla. 554 (1878).
.BASTARDY
Should the putative father then invoke his right against self-incrimina-
tion, the jury is left to consider the testimony of the friends.
However, assuming the defendant does not claim his fifth amend-
ment privilege, and instead asserts the defense of Exceptio Plurium
Concubentium,71 some more scandal is added to the proceedings. The
Exceptio defense provides that if the mother had relations with a man
other than the defendant at or about the time of conception, the defen-
dant cannot be found to be the father." As the court stated in Yarmark
v. Strickland: "
[U]nless identification of the father is otherwise made possi-
ble through some tests or means afforded by advancing medical
knowledge, establishment of the fact of intercourse with an-
other at or about the time for conception precludes determina-
tion of which man is the father.
If the best interests of the child are to be served, it is difficult to
understand why the putative father should be relieved of all liability
when he can establish an Exceptio defense. It would seem that a better
result would obtain if the court, though unable to decide the issue of
paternity, would shift the burden to the defendant to prove that he was
not the father,79 if it could be established that he had intercourse with
the mother within such a time that he might be the father of the child. 0
If the defendant were unable to sustain his burden of proof, then he
should be held liable for the support of the child. 8"
Further, if it could be established that any one of two or more
persons who had intercourse with the woman might be the father, then
a presumption should arise that each person is a possible father.8 2 The
burden of exculpation would be on the possible fathers, and those fa-
thers unable to affirmatively disprove the allegations that they were the
putative father, should be held jointly and severally liable for the sup-
port of the child.8"
76. Roughly translated, Exceptio Plurium Concubentium means the "exception of
several lovers."
77. H. CLARKE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 5.3 (1968).
78. 193 So.2d 212, 215 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
79. The defendant could resort to those defenses normally available in such proceedings.
For example, he could take a blood test, or attempt to prove sterility, impotency, or non-
access.
80. Comment, Liability of Possible Fathers: A Support Remedy for Illegitimate Chil-
dren, 18 STAN. L. REV. 859 (1966).
81. Castberg, The Children's Rights, Laws and Maternity Insurance in Norway, 16 J.
CoMP. LEG. & INT'L L. 283 (new series 1916).
82. 1 N.S. REV. STAT. c. 31, § I(f) (1954). See also Child Welfare Act, 3 SASK. REV.
STAT. c. 239, § 88(2) (1953).
83. This idea of requiring the defendant to prove a negative is similar to the situation
in Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), where two defendants were hunting
and fired their guns simultaneously, each failing to notice the plaintiff in his line of fire.
The plaintiff was injured; however, it was not possible to determine from whose gun the
bullet came. Since the court could not establish the cause-in-fact, both defendants were
held liable for the injury.
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3. RELIEF AFFORDED THE MOTHER: THE AWARD
AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
Should the court resolve the issue of paternity in favor of the
mother, Florida Statutes section 742.031 (1967), provides that the court
shall determine the amount to be paid the mother for medical care, costs
of confinement, and other expenses incident to the birth of the child,
after considering the "ability of the parents to pay." An alimony award
is based on the wife's needs and the husband's ability to pay. 4 Appar-
ently, the legislature did not intend the court to consider the child's
needs in a paternity action, but rather the court should determine the
whole matter of payment from the "ability to pay" aspect.
As heretofore stated, 5 the Paternity Act sets forth scheduled
monthly payments to be made by the putative father, ranging from $40
per month to $110 per month, depending upon the age of the child.8 6
Although this statute has been praised for providing payments "as high
as $1320 per annum,' 8 7 it is still subject to the criticism that it focuses
on the ability of the defendant to pay rather than on the needs of the
child. Furthermore, it is curious to note that support orders for legit-
imate children, entered pursuant to a divorce judgment, often provide
for significantly higher payment. One wonders if the scheduled payments
can even be justified on the basis that they at least provide a "floor"88
in view of the fact that the scheduled payments have remained static
since 195 1,8 even though the cost of living index has risen since then.
Perhaps, the main defect in the payment plan provided for by
statute is in the nature of an error of omission. That is, some states
such as Minnesota ° and North Dakota9l have administrative boards
to assist mothers in the enforcement of their rights under the illegitimacy
laws; Florida lacks such an agency. Instead, a Florida mother is forced
to return to her attorney and attempt to collect any periodic payments
in arrears by petitioning for a rule to show cause.9 2 More often than
not, the putative father lacks the funds to pay the accumulated arrear-
ages, and the court's only recourse is to give the mother a judgment or
confine the father to jail for contempt.98
84. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08, and accompanying notes (1968).
85. See p. 714 supra.
86. See p. 720 supra.
87. Comment, Liability of Possible Fathers: A Support Remedy for Illegitimate
Children, 18 STAN. L. REV. 859, 866 (1966).
88. Interview with Quentin Eldred, Director of the Dade County Legal Aid Society, in
Miami, Florida, Mar. 5, 1969.
89. See note 10 supra.
90. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 256.72-.87 (1959).
91. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-36-22 (1960).
92. FLA. STAT. § 742.08 (1967). This same problem also exists in the collection of
periodic payments on behalf of a legitimate child.
93. This is an anomaly because a bastardy proceeding is civil in nature. FLA. CONST.
DECL. OF RIGHTS § 16 provides that "No person shall be imprisoned for debt, except in cases
of fraud." Although such imprisonment might be justified on the theory that maintenance
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While it is true that a far-sighted court might prevent this inequity
by requiring the defendant to post bond,94 in actual practice, such a
result rarely obtains. Consequently, the father spends three days in jail,
the attorney's fees increase, and the mother and child are back on the
welfare rolls.
IV. THE SOLUTIONS AVAILABLE
A. Abortion Reform
Certainly, the most obvious way to curb the problems of illegit-
imacy is to reduce the number of illegitimate births, and the most direct
means to accomplish this result is through liberalized abortion laws.
Although it is not within the scope of this article to include a full dis-
cussion on the advisability of allowing complete freedom in the pro-
curement of abortions, no one can doubt the validity of the argument
that if it were easier to procure abortions, fewer illegitimate children
would be born.9 5
The Florida Legislature once again introduced an abortion bill this
year,9" and once again it died with that body. Nevertheless, the bill,
should it have passed, was not so liberal that it allowed abortion "on
demand," and, hence, its value in reducing illegitimate births would have
been limited indeed.
B. Birth Control
If necessary, resort must be had to more indirect means of limiting
illegitimate births. It may be desirable to prevent the conception of the
illegitimate child in the first place through a fuller and more widespread
understanding and distribution of birth control methods and materials.
Presently, birth control information is not available to those who
need it most. In fact, it has been estimated that only one-half of all
unwed mothers have any access to birth control information.97 It fol-
lows that more attention must be given to the distribution of information
about, and materials for, birth control. Although this goal is not the
peculiar responsibility of the law, the legal system, being an instrument
of social policy, does have a duty in this area.
A recent article in the American Bar Association Journal has gone
so far as to suggest that in the event a minor child has already con-
ceived one illegitimate child, a court should order compulsory contracep-
payments, like alimony, are not debts, but moral obligations, and that the defendant is
free to choose between incarceration and compliance with the order, the defendant is still
being involuntarily incarcerated in the event of noncompliance. See In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448
(8th Cir. 1902); Acker v. Adamson, 67 S. D. 341, 293 N.W. 83 (1940).
94. FLA. STAT. § 742.08 (1967).
95. See Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 Am. J. Soc. 215, 221, 231 (1939).
96. S. B. 208, 1969 Leg., 1st Sess. (1969).
97. Furie, Birth Control & The Lower-Class Unmarried Mother, 11 Soc. WORK 42, 49
(1966).
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tion by means of an I.U.D.9 8 The authors contend that the authority
for such action may be derived from the statutes of most states"9 which
subject a child whose behavior is injurious to his own or others' welfare
to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.'
The objections to this form of court-ordered contraception are
many. First, there are medical defects in the I.U.D.-expulsion is ex-
pected in 10 percent of insertions in the first year; another 10 percent
suffer abnormal bleeding and pain; and the pregnancy rate, even with
the device, is 5.3 percent.10 ' Another objection is that the I.U.D. oper-
ates by expelling an already fertilized egg through a coil; consequently,
it may be illegal since it is a type of abortion device.
Finally, there may be some issue as to the constitutionality of a
law which provides for court-ordered contraception. Although such a
law might be analogized to compulsory sterilization statutes, which were
held to be constitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Buck
v. Bell, ° it is necessary to remember the date of that decision. It is
also necessary to consider that infringement of a woman's right to bear
children might infringe on her right to privacy, and that in recent years
the right to privacy has gained the protection of first amendment
rights.10 8 As a first amendment right, a state would have to show a
compelling reason for infringing thereon, and it is unlikely that the pos-
sibility of saving welfare money would be considered a compelling rea-
son.
Thus, although contraception can reduce the number of illegitimate
births, it appears likely that medical, religious, and constitutional con-
siderations will keep contraception on a voluntary basis.
C. Adoption Without Consent
Since in Florida, an adopted child is considered legitimate as to
his adopting parents,0 4 the law should facilitate adoption as much as
possible. To this end, consent of the mother of the child to adoption
should no longer be required.10 5 Where the facts of the case do not
warrant a finding that the mother has abandoned her child, yet seem
to indicate that she has waived her presumptive right to custody by her
failure to properly support the child, or by her failure to care for the
child's welfare, 06 the lack of the mother's consent to adoption should
98. Alverson, Young & Young, Court-Ordered Contraception, 55 A.B.A.J. 223 (Mar.
1969).
99. Id. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.01(11) (1967).
100. Id. at 223, 224.
101. Id. at 226.
102. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
103. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
104. FLA. STAT. § 63.151 (1967).
105. FLA. STAT. § 63.081(1) (1967).
106. The failure to care for the child must be such that it would indicate that the child
is a "dependent child" within the meaning of FLA. STAT. § 39.01(10) (1967).
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not be a bar if adoption would otherwise be in the best interests of the
child.
However, this solution is not likely to meet with much success.
There are those who believe that the mere fact of parenthood alone is
an important factor in determining the best interests of the child, and
that the adopted child faces great psycho-sociological problems in search-
ing for his identity. I0 7 A more tangible problem arises in the fact that the
greatest number of illegitimate children are born to nonwhite mothers,'
and consequently, the number of adoptees would far exceed the number
of adopting parents.
D. Revision of the Existing Paternity Act
If the law is to be a realistic instrument of social policy, then it
is time that it be revised to conform to the needs of society. The fol-
lowing bill is proposed as a remedy for some of the existing problems.
THE FLORIDA PATERNITY ACT-A PROPOSAL
Chapter 70-00
An Act relating to paternity proceedings; amending Chapter
72, Florida Statutes, by amending Sections 742.011; 742.021;
742.031; 742.041; 742.07; 742.08 and 742.091; and by adding
thereto Section 742.071, to provide that this Chapter be en-
titled Paternity; to provide that a married woman or the State
of Florida or a public agency thereof may institute paternity
proceedings; and to provide for the liability of one or more
putative fathers for the maintenance of their illegitimate child;
to repeal the provision for a jury trial; to provide that the
amount of periodic payments be determined by judicial dis-
cretion; to provide for the enforcement of maintenance awards;
and to provide an effective date.
Be it Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. Section 742.011, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
742.011 Paternity proceedings: circuit court jurisdiction
Paternity proceedings may be brought in the circuit court
by any woman who shall be pregnant or delivered of a bastard
child, or by the State of Florida, or a public agency thereof,
on her behalf.
A bastard child includes a child born to a married woman
by a man other than her husband.
Comment:
This section is patterned after sections 1 and 2 of the Uniform Act
107. Interview with Quentin Eldred, Director of the Dade County Legal Aid Society,
in Miami, Florida, Mar. 5, 1969.
108. See note 2 supra.
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on Paternity. 10 9 Inherent in this revision is the abolition of the presump-
tion of legitimacy of a child conceived or born during marriage.
Section 2. Section 742.021, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
742.021 Same; venue, process, complaint
The proceedings shall be by verified complaint filed in the
circuit court of the county in which the woman resides or of the
county in which any one of the alleged fathers reside. The com-
plaint shall aver sufficient facts charging the paternity of the
child, and shall set forth with specificity the names of those
persons alleged to be the father of the child. Process directed
to the defendant(s) shall issue forthwith requiring the de-
fendant(s) to file his (their) written defenses to the complaint.
Upon application and proof under oath, the court may issue
a writ of ne exeat against the defendants, or any one of them,
on such terms and conditions and conditioned upon bond in
such amount(s) as the court may determine.
Section 3. Section 742.031, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
742.031 Same; hearings, court orders, support, hospital
expenses, etc.
(1) Hearings for the purpose of establishing or refuting
the allegations of the complaint and answer(s) shall be held in
the chambers and may be restricted to such persons, in addition
to the parties involved and their counsel, as the judge in his
discretion may direct.
(2) The court shall determine the issues of paternity of the
child, the needs of the child, and the ability of the parents to
support the child; and if the court shall find the sole defendant
to be the father of the child, he shall so order and shall further
order the defendant to pay the complainant, her guardian or
such other person assuming responsibility for the child as the
judge may direct, such sum or sums as shall be sufficient to pay
reasonable attorney's fees, hospital or medical expenses, cost
of confinement and any other expenses incident to the birth of
such child.
(3) If the court is unable to determine the issue of pa-
ternity of the child because of the existence of multiple de-
fendants, the defendants shall nevertheless be held liable for
such costs and expenses as specified in subsection (2) herein,
and for the performance of such other duties as the court shall
in its discretion direct, provided that the defendants have had
intercourse with the mother within such a time that in the
ordinary course of nature, they, or any one of them, might be
the father of the child.
(4) In addition, the court shall order the defendant(s) to
109. 9 B UNIFOR-m LAWS ANN. 522, 524 (1966).
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pay periodically for the support of such child such sums as
shall be fixed by the court in accordance with the provisions
of this act, and also all taxable costs of the proceedings.
Comment:
Sections 2 and 3 of this act are designed to provide for the liability
of "possible fathers." 110 In effect, each man who has had relations with
the mother during the period in which the child might have been con-
ceived is declared a possible father, and, in the absence of exculpatory
evidence, is jointly and severally liable with the other possible fathers
for the support of the child."'
Additionally, subsection (4) of section 3 of this act omits the pro-
vision for a jury trial on the issue of paternity.
Section 4. Section 742.041, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
742.041 Same; monthly contributions
The court shall order the defendant(s) to pay monthly for
the care and support of such child an amount which in the dis-
cretion of the judge seems fair and equitable, depending on the
needs of the child and the circumstances and ability of the
defendant(s).
Section 5. Chapter 72, Florida Statutes, is amended by adding
Section 742.071, to read:
742.071 Same; enforcement
The liability of the defendant(s) for the payment of any
sums ordered by the court to be paid may be enforced in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this act (1) by the mother,
child, or the public agency which has furnished or may furnish
the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education,
necessary support, or funeral expenses, and (2) by other per-
sons including private agencies to the extent that they have
furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement,
education, necessary support, or funeral expenses.
Comment:
This provision is substantially the same as section 2 of the Uniform
Act on Paternity."12
Section 6. Section 742.07, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
110. See discussion in text supra, p. 721.
111. The rationale for the imposition of liability on a possible father is analogous to the
situation of joint tortfeasors. In both situations there is an innocent victim (here, the child),
there are culpable defendants, and the cause-in-fact cannot be proved. Hence, the better
rule, as stated in Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), is to let the wrongdoers
fight it out instead of letting the innocent victim suffer.
112. 9 B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 522, 524 (1966).
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742.07 Effect of adoption
Upon the adoption of a child, for whom support has been
ordered, by some person other than (one of) the father(s), the
liability of the father(s) so ordered to pay for the support of
the child shall be terminated. In the event the child is adopted
by one of the fathers ordered by the court to pay for the
support of such child, the liability of the other fathers ordered
to pay for the support of the child shall be terminated.
Comment:
This section is structured so as to apply in two situations. In the first
situation, where the child is adopted by a person who was not named as
a defendant in the paternity action, the effect of the adoption is to
relieve those defendants ordered to pay for the child's support of their
obligation. In the second situation, where the child is adopted by a person
who had been named as a defendant in the paternity action, and who had
been found to be a "possible father" as a result of the action, the effect of
the adoption is to relieve the other "possible fathers," who had been
ordered to pay for the child's support, of their obligation. In other words,
the support obligation is shifted to the adopting parent.
Section 7. Section 742.08, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
742.08 Default of support payments
Upon default in payment of any moneys ordered by the
court to be paid, the court may enter a judgment for the amount
in default which shall be a lien upon all property of the defen-
dant, both real and personal. Willful failure to comply with an
order of the court shall be deemed a contempt of the court
entering the order and shall be punished as such. The court may
require bond of the defendant(s) for the faithful performance
of his (their) obligation(s) under the order of the court in such
amount(s) and upon such conditions as the court shall direct.
Section 8. Section 742.091, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:
742.091 Marriage of parents
If the mother of any bastard child and (any one of)
the reputed father(s) shall at any time after its birth inter-
marry, the child shall in all respects be deemed and held legit-
imate, and upon the payment of all costs and attorney's fees
as determined by the court, the cause shall be dismissed and
the bond provided for in section 742.021 shall be void. The
record of the proceedings in such cases shall be sealed against
public inspection in the interests of the child.
Section 9. This Act shall take effect immediately upon be-
coming a law, and shall apply to all cases of birth out of wed-
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lock as defined in this Act where birth occurs after this Act
takes effect.
V. CONCLUSION
It should be apparent that this statutory reform is merely a com-
promise. It eases the economic burden facing the mother, the child, and
the public. By imposing more stringent liability on the father, or possible
father, it attempts to discourage immorality. The reform, however, is at
best an attempt to reduce the difficulties that the illegitimate child will
encounter. By no means does the proposal claim to solve the problem of
illegitimacy for that of course can only be achieved through the preven-
tion of births out-of-wedlock.
